The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training in Commercial Aviation.¶
Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A. C., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training in Commercial Aviation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(1), 19-32.
Cited by¶
8 citations across 8 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Antifragility
This sourceBibliography-only; verified and linked.
- Common Ground
- Recognising this prevents the error of assuming that "everyone has seen it" suffices for safe joint action, when in fact additional confirmation rounds are required — which is why crew-resource-management and surgical timeouts build in repeated explicit confirmations.
This sourceDescribes crew resource management, whose explicit confirmation protocols (read-backs, callouts) build repeated common ground in the cockpit.
- Recognising this prevents the error of assuming that "everyone has seen it" suffices for safe joint action, when in fact additional confirmation rounds are required — which is why crew-resource-management and surgical timeouts build in repeated explicit confirmations.
- Epistemic Humility
- Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.
- Organizational Culture
- Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.
- Procedure-Work Mismatch
- Crew Resource Management, born from cockpit incidents where the procedure-practice gap killed people, transferred to operating-theatre teamwork and ICU rounding.
This sourceDocuments CRM's origin in cockpit incidents and transfer to operating-theatre and ICU teamwork.
- Crew Resource Management, born from cockpit incidents where the procedure-practice gap killed people, transferred to operating-theatre teamwork and ICU rounding.
- Psychological Safety
Domain-specific¶
- Assembly Bonus Effect
- After accident investigations in the 1970s (notably the 1978 United 173 fuel-exhaustion crash) traced disasters to crews in which a captain's error went unchallenged, airlines restructured the cockpit as an error-correcting team: first officers and engineers are trained and authorized to cross-check, question, and correct the captain, and standardized challenge-and-response callouts institutionalize the checking
This sourceThe documented shift in commercial aviation from cockpit to crew resource management and its error-management rationale - training crews to avoid, trap and mitigate error - which is the error-correcting-team restructuring described here; the 1970s accident history and the callout procedures are not established by this source.
- After accident investigations in the 1970s (notably the 1978 United 173 fuel-exhaustion crash) traced disasters to crews in which a captain's error went unchallenged, airlines restructured the cockpit as an error-correcting team: first officers and engineers are trained and authorized to cross-check, question, and correct the captain, and standardized challenge-and-response callouts institutionalize the checking
Mechanisms¶
- Mistake-to-Principle Story Template
- It is the deliberate version of the tradition, strongest in aviation, of generalizing accident findings into transferable crew behaviors.
This sourceTraces aviation accident findings into CRM training focused on transferable crew behaviors.
- It is the deliberate version of the tradition, strongest in aviation, of generalizing accident findings into transferable crew behaviors.
Verification¶
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