The Difference between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof.¶
DeKay, M. L. (1996). The Difference between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof. Law & Social Inquiry, 21(1), 95-132.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Signal Detection Theory
- In judicial decision-making, the sensitivity of evidence to guilt and the criterion of "reasonable doubt" are explicitly named in legal doctrine.
This sourceApplies signal-detection / decision-theory framing to adjudication, showing the standard of proof is a criterion (response bias) on evidence whose discriminability is a separate quantity, and that error-cost ratios do not fix the threshold.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
DeKay's abstract treats jury discriminability and the probabilistic proof threshold as separate quantities, matching the signal-detection framing.
“the accuracy with which juries discriminate between truly innocent and truly guilty defendants”
- In judicial decision-making, the sensitivity of evidence to guilt and the criterion of "reasonable doubt" are explicitly named in legal doctrine.
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