Altruistic punishment in humans

Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415(6868), 137-140.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2002

Volume

415

Issue

6868

Pages

137-140

DOI

10.1038/415137a

DOI registrant

Springer Nature

Link

https://doi.org/10.1038/415137a

Cited from

economics_finance, sociology_anthropology

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Cooperation
  • The treaty-compliance problem in diplomacy maps onto open-source contribution, onto vampire-bat blood-sharing, and onto the maintenance of a public good in a village irrigation system.

    This sourceExperimental evidence that costly, decentralized punishment of defectors sustains cooperation (which collapses when punishment is ruled out), supporting the transfer of the distributed-sanction mechanism across substrates.

    Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract

    Supplies human laboratory evidence that costly punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and that cooperation collapses without it; it says nothing about treaties, open source, vampire bats, or irrigation.

    “We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out.”

    Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked

• Informal Enforcement
  • Because the prime isolates the mechanism rather than any domain's particular furniture, the transfer is conceptual rather than merely metaphorical.

    This sourceExperimental evidence that decentralized, costly punishment of defectors sustains cooperation across human groups; supports the conceptual-transfer claim that the distributed-sanction mechanism recurs across substrates from biology to social organization.

• Reciprocity

  • This sourceExperimental evidence that decentralized, costly punishment of defectors sustains cooperation across human groups; supports the conceptual-transfer claim that the distributed-sanction mechanism recurs across substrates from biology to social organization.

Verification

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Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 3 citations: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.

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Registry ID ref:62c4fdad9ef6 · see in the full table