Altruistic punishment in humans

Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415(6868), 137-140.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2002

DOI

10.1038/415137a

Link

https://doi.org/10.1038/415137a

Cited from

economics_finance, sociology_anthropology

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Cooperation
  • The treaty-compliance problem in diplomacy maps onto open-source contribution, onto vampire-bat blood-sharing, and onto the maintenance of a public good in a village irrigation system.

    This sourceExperimental evidence that costly, decentralized punishment of defectors sustains cooperation (which collapses when punishment is ruled out), supporting the transfer of the distributed-sanction mechanism across substrates.

• Informal Enforcement
  • Because the prime isolates the mechanism rather than any domain's particular furniture, the transfer is conceptual rather than merely metaphorical.

    This sourceExperimental evidence that decentralized, costly punishment of defectors sustains cooperation across human groups; supports the conceptual-transfer claim that the distributed-sanction mechanism recurs across substrates from biology to social organization.

• Reciprocity

  • This sourceExperimental evidence that decentralized, costly punishment of defectors sustains cooperation across human groups; supports the conceptual-transfer claim that the distributed-sanction mechanism recurs across substrates from biology to social organization.

Verification

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