Avoiding the resource curse the case Norway¶
Holden. (2013). Avoiding the resource curse the case Norway.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Paradox of Plenty (Resource Curse)
- The counterfactual is not theoretical — Norway and Nigeria both became major oil producers in the early 1970s, but Norway legislated a Government Petroleum Fund in 1990 (its first capital transfer came in 1996) and in 2001 adopted a fiscal rule admitting only the fund's expected real return into the budget — initially set at 4 percent and reduced to 3 percent in 2017 — and has maintained high governance and human-development indicators across the half-century since its first oil
This sourceHolden's Energy Policy study is the standard account of why Norway escaped the curse - the management of petroleum revenues through the fund and a spending rule keyed to its expected real return; the dates in this sentence are separately sourced (NBIM for the 1990 statute and the 1996 first transfer, the Ministry of Finance for the 2001 rule at 4 percent and its 2017 reduction to 3), and the governance and human-development indicators are not series this paper reports.
- The counterfactual is not theoretical — Norway and Nigeria both became major oil producers in the early 1970s, but Norway legislated a Government Petroleum Fund in 1990 (its first capital transfer came in 1996) and in 2001 adopted a fiscal rule admitting only the fund's expected real return into the budget — initially set at 4 percent and reduced to 3 percent in 2017 — and has maintained high governance and human-development indicators across the half-century since its first oil
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