Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All.

Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000). Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 791-810.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2000

Volume

115

Issue

3

Pages

791-810

DOI

10.1162/003355300554917

DOI registrant

Oxford University Press

Link

https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554917

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive
  • Crowding-out reasoning: when does monetising an act reduce its supply? — the blood-donation and late-pickup-fine literatures, intrinsic-motivation effects.

    This sourceDemonstrates crowding-out — monetizing an act can reduce its supply by displacing intrinsic or civic motivation.

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