Crime and Punishment¶
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Continuity
- In policy and regulatory design, continuous penalty schedules avoid the cliff-edge gaming behavior of discrete tier systems (a continuous fine schedule rising smoothly with violation severity dominates a step-function tier system on both fairness and incentive grounds, in line with the rational-actor analysis of Becker (1968))
This sourceFoundational rational-actor analysis of optimal penalty design; establishes the framework in which marginal incentives derived from penalty schedules align with marginal social harm, providing the economic basis for replacing tier-based regulatory systems with smooth proportionality.
- In policy and regulatory design, continuous penalty schedules avoid the cliff-edge gaming behavior of discrete tier systems (a continuous fine schedule rising smoothly with violation severity dominates a step-function tier system on both fairness and incentive grounds, in line with the rational-actor analysis of Becker (1968))
- Incentive
- In law and regulation it is criminal penalties as deterrents, civil damages internalising harm, whistleblower bounties, and pollution-trading rights.
This sourcePenalties as deterrents working through the expected-payoff calculus (detection probability times sanction), the framework behind fine-and-detection design for illegal dumping.
- In law and regulation it is criminal penalties as deterrents, civil damages internalising harm, whistleblower bounties, and pollution-trading rights.
Mechanisms¶
- Audit and Penalty System
- Framed as a gamble the participant faces, it makes the deterrence explicit — the expected cost of cheating simply has to exceed the expected gain.
This sourceIt is the analytic backbone of why a low audit rate paired with a large penalty can deter, and why the two are partial substitutes.
- Framed as a gamble the participant faces, it makes the deterrence explicit — the expected cost of cheating simply has to exceed the expected gain.
Verification¶
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