Skip to content

The Sunk-Cost Fallacy in Penny Auctions

Augenblick. (2015). The Sunk-Cost Fallacy in Penny Auctions. The Review of Economic Studies.

Type
Journal article
Intellectual base
Review or monograph
Year
2015
DOI
10.1093/restud/rdv037
DOI registrant
Oxford University Press
Link
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv037

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Domain-specific

  • Dollar Auction
    • "Penny auction" websites such as Swoopo (studied by Ned Augenblick, 2016) commercialised exactly this structure

      This sourceThe empirical study of penny auctions (two data sets covering 166,000 auctions) showing the mechanism is structurally all-pay while explaining bidder behaviour by a sunk-cost fallacy. The empirical study establishing that penny-auction bidders commit non-refundable costs for each bid as the auction continues.

      Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract

      “As in the US dollars or war-of-attrition, players in penny auctions commit higher non-refundable costs as the auction continues and only win if all other players stop bidding.”

      From the publisher's abstract.

      Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked

Verification

Does it exist? Not checked yet. This work's DOI is recorded above but has not been resolved against an external catalogue, so nothing here confirms the work exists.

Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 1 citation: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.

Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.

See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:688802b90904 · see in the full table