The Art of War¶
Jomini, A. (1862). The Art of War. Précis de l'art de la guerre.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Defeat In Detail
- In military strategy, the origin substrate, the pattern names Napoleon's central-position campaigns against coalitions whose armies could not combine, Lee's split at Chancellorsville, and naval actions where one fleet caught divided squadrons in turn; the doctrinal vocabulary of defeat in detail, central position, and interior lines is well developed.
This sourceTrans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1862. Formalizes the principles of concentration, interior lines, the central position, and defeating a divided enemy in detail by concentrating against each portion in turn before it can unite.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Jomini supplies the interior-lines and central-position vocabulary and Napoleon's defeat of divided enemies in detail, but nothing on Lee at Chancellorsville or naval actions.
“His plan is to separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by the battle of Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic lines, and beats them successively at Mondovi and Lodi.”
- In military strategy, the origin substrate, the pattern names Napoleon's central-position campaigns against coalitions whose armies could not combine, Lee's split at Chancellorsville, and naval actions where one fleet caught divided squadrons in turn; the doctrinal vocabulary of defeat in detail, central position, and interior lines is well developed.
- Interior Lines
- Military strategy. Forces at a central position facing simultaneous fronts can shift reserves between them faster than separated adversaries can coordinate; the principle was codified in classical military doctrine and refined by its later critics.
This sourceTrans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1862 [orig. 1838]. Codifies the doctrine of interior lines — a central force operating on diverging lines, closer to separated enemy forces than they are to one another, shifting reserves between fronts faster than they can coordinate, and concentrating at the decisive point.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Jomini defines interior lines as letting a general concentrate faster than the enemy can, supporting the military principle but not the claim that later critics refined it.
“interior or central lines will be preferable to exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can be concentrated before those of the enemy”
- Military strategy. Forces at a central position facing simultaneous fronts can shift reserves between them faster than separated adversaries can coordinate; the principle was codified in classical military doctrine and refined by its later critics.
Domain-specific¶
- Line of Operation
- The concept licenses the interior-lines move as a specific lever: a force operating on interior lines between two axes is read as able to concentrate sequentially against either, multiplying its effective combat power, so positioning to hold interior lines is an intervention with a predicted force-multiplying effect
SupportedVerified against the source
- The concept licenses the interior-lines move as a specific lever: a force operating on interior lines between two axes is read as able to concentrate sequentially against either, multiplying its effective combat power, so positioning to hold interior lines is an intervention with a predicted force-multiplying effect
Mechanisms¶
- Interior-Lines Route Model
- The principle of interior lines — a central force operating on shorter internal paths defeating larger forces on exterior lines
This sourceDefines interior lines as enabling a centrally placed force to concentrate sooner than an opponent can bring a greater force to bear.
- The principle of interior lines — a central force operating on shorter internal paths defeating larger forces on exterior lines
- Sequential Concentration Drill
- A brigade holds a battalion in reserve on the theory that its central position lets it reinforce either of two threatened sectors faster than the opposing force can shift strength between them — the classic advantage of interior lines.
This sourceTrans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. J. B. Lippincott & Co. (1862). Explains how a central position and interior lines can permit concentration against separated opposing forces.
- A brigade holds a battalion in reserve on the theory that its central position lets it reinforce either of two threatened sectors faster than the opposing force can shift strength between them — the classic advantage of interior lines.
Verification¶
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
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