Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice.¶
Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991). Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27(1), 76-105.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Omission Bias
- In ethics and moral philosophy it is the structure behind the acts/omissions doctrine and the intuitions probed by trolley problems — the widespread sense that actively diverting harm onto one person is worse than passively allowing a greater harm to befall others, even when the outcomes favor acting.
This sourceEstablishes the omission/commission distinction in moral judgment and its basis in causal and intentional attribution.
- In ethics and moral philosophy it is the structure behind the acts/omissions doctrine and the intuitions probed by trolley problems — the widespread sense that actively diverting harm onto one person is worse than passively allowing a greater harm to befall others, even when the outcomes favor acting.
Mechanisms¶
- Omission–Commission Parity Check
- Its strength is that it drags the invisible enablers into view and stops responsibility concentrating on the last visible actor — a direct counter to the well-documented tendency to under-weight harmful omissions
This sourceFinds that harmful omissions are often rated less immoral or less bad than comparable harmful acts.
- Its strength is that it drags the invisible enablers into view and stops responsibility concentrating on the last visible actor — a direct counter to the well-documented tendency to under-weight harmful omissions
Verification¶
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