The Sybil Attack.

Douceur, J. R. (2002). The Sybil Attack. Peer-to-Peer Systems.

Type

Book chapter

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

2002

DOI

10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24

ISBN

9783540441793

Link

https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24

Cited from

communication_media_studies, economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Access Friction
  • The composition filter is explicit: membership in the set of block-producers reflects who could afford the computational cost, which is precisely the point — it makes Sybil attacks (one actor cheaply spawning many identities to outvote the network) structurally expensive, since each identity must pay the full work cost.

    This sourceDefines the Sybil attack — a single actor cheaply forging many identities to outvote a network — and argues that without a costly entry barrier identities cannot be made expensive, the threat proof-of-work's per-identity work cost is designed to defeat.

• Vouched Anonymity
  • Without it, anyone wishing to act on a hidden-origin contribution must stand up a verification apparatus of their own — that the source exists, had the access claimed, has no disqualifying interest, and is not three other sources wearing different hats — and rebuild it for every contributor.

Verification

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