The politics of government decision-making

Laffont, J. -., & Tirole, J. (1991). The politics of government decision-making: A theory of regulatory capture. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1089-1127.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1991

Volume

106

Issue

4

Pages

1089-1127

DOI registrant

registered by a platform that did not publish the work; the publisher is not recorded

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/2937958 not authoritativefound

Cited from

behavioral_economics

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Regulatory Capture
  • The principal-agent frame assumes the regulator can be realigned by better incentives or monitoring; regulatory capture suggests that institutional structure itself is compromised, a contrast Laffont and Tirole (1991) sharpen in their formal theory of incentives in regulation.

    This sourceFormal principal-supervisor-agent model distinguishing pure principal-agent slack from capture via active redirection of the regulator by the regulated.

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