On Moral Hazard and Insurance¶
Shavell, S. (1979). On Moral Hazard and Insurance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4), 541-562.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Risk-Sharing or Deductible Clause
- When one party can take unobservable care — patch the systems, drive carefully, service the equipment — and another party bears the cost of neglect, full coverage quietly rewards slacking: this is moral hazard.
This sourceShows why unobservable care combined with fuller insurance coverage can weaken loss-prevention incentives.
- When one party can take unobservable care — patch the systems, drive carefully, service the equipment — and another party bears the cost of neglect, full coverage quietly rewards slacking: this is moral hazard.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:70f63ebe237a · see in the full table