The evolution of ethnocentrism¶
Hammond, R. A., & Axelrod, R. (2006). The evolution of ethnocentrism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(6), 926-936.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Ethnocentrism
- Hammond and Axelrod's evolutionary analysis
This sourceAgent-based evolutionary model showing in-group-favoring (ethnocentric) strategies become widespread and can sustain high cooperation even in one-move prisoner's dilemmas
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The paper's abstract reports an agent-based evolutionary model in which in-group-favoring strategies spread and sustain high cooperation, even in one-move prisoner's dilemma games, and can be necessary to sustain costly cooperation.
“such behaviors can become widespread under a broad range of conditions and can support very high levels of cooperation, even in one-move prisoner’s dilemma games. When cooperation is especially costly to individuals, the authors show how ethnocentrism itself can be necessary to sustain cooperation.”
- Hammond and Axelrod's evolutionary analysis
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:736b34510d73 · see in the full table