The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence.¶
Dixit, A. (1980). The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence. The Economic Journal, 90(357), 95-106.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Credible Commitment
- Credibility requires a choice-set restriction that opens a cost-of-defection wedge: the incumbent builds excess production capacity in advance — a sunk, observable specific asset — which lowers its marginal cost of fighting so that, at the execution moment, fighting becomes the best response.
This sourceShows sunk excess-capacity investment lowers the incumbent's marginal cost of fighting, making the price-war threat credible at the execution moment.
- Credibility requires a choice-set restriction that opens a cost-of-defection wedge: the incumbent builds excess production capacity in advance — a sunk, observable specific asset — which lowers its marginal cost of fighting so that, at the execution moment, fighting becomes the best response.
Verification¶
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