The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions

Bulow, J., & Roberts, J. (1989). The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 1060-1090.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1989

Pages

1060-1090

DOI

10.1086/261643

DOI registrant

University of Chicago Press

Link

https://doi.org/10.1086/261643

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Domain-specific

• Virtual Valuation
  • This calculation explains the “marginal revenue” interpretation emphasized by Bulow and Roberts and modern mechanism-design texts.

Verification

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