Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark.¶
Kleven, H., Knudsen, M., Kreiner, C. T., Pedersen, S., & Saez, E. (2011). Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark. Econometrica, 79(3), 651-692.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Coercion
- and to tax compliance (visible audit programs outperform headline penalty rates)
This sourceField-experimental evidence that randomized audit threats (raising perceived detection probability) increase reported income.
- and to tax compliance (visible audit programs outperform headline penalty rates)
- Deterrence
- The criminological finding that perceived probability of capture dominates sentence severity transfers directly: in cyber, broadcasting attribution capability shifts attacker behaviour more than escalating declared penalties; in tax compliance, visible audit programmes outperform headline-rate fines.
This sourceRandomized field experiment showing that audit and detection probability (third-party reporting, audit threat) drives tax compliance — the perceived-probability-over-magnitude finding transferred to tax enforcement.
- The criminological finding that perceived probability of capture dominates sentence severity transfers directly: in cyber, broadcasting attribution capability shifts attacker behaviour more than escalating declared penalties; in tax compliance, visible audit programmes outperform headline-rate fines.
Verification¶
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