Climate Clubs

Nordhaus, W. D. (2015). Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy. American Economic Review, 105(4), 1339-1370.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2015

Volume

105

Issue

4

Pages

1339-1370

DOI registrant

American Economic Association

Link

https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000001 not authoritativefound

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Tragedy of the Commons
  • Contemporary extensions include: Global commons theory (Stern 2007 on climate as a commons; Barrett 2003 on environmental-statecraft; Nordhaus 2015

    This sourceClimate commons and mechanism design; proposes climate clubs as a governance architecture to address free-riding in climate negotiations.

Verification

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