The Economics of Welfare¶
Pigou, A. C. (1920). The Economics of Welfare.
Cited by¶
9 citations across 9 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Cost–Benefit Analysis
- The method's modern form emerged from the interaction of early-twentieth-century welfare economics — particularly A.C. Pigou's
This sourceMacmillan. Originating exposition of externalities and corrective taxation: a tax equal to the marginal external damage internalizes a previously external social cost into the producer's private accounting.
- The method's modern form emerged from the interaction of early-twentieth-century welfare economics — particularly A.C. Pigou's
- Deadweight Loss
- Externality
- with the concept of external economies and external diseconomies, was formalized and given welfare-economics treatment by A. C. Pigou (1920)
This sourceMacmillan. Originating welfare-economics exposition of externalities and corrective taxation: a tax equal to the marginal external damage makes a previously external social cost appear inside the producer's private accounting, internalizing the externality. SUPPORTS the Pigouvian-formalization claim (146).
- with the concept of external economies and external diseconomies, was formalized and given welfare-economics treatment by A. C. Pigou (1920)
- Idealized-Substrate Fallacy
- The substrate audit is the corrective: re-enumerate the dropped terms and re-introduce each as an explicit parameter (a Pigouvian tax for unbargainable externalities, a liability rule chosen with bargaining cost in mind).
This sourceEstablishes the corrective (Pigouvian) tax for externalities that the market cannot bargain away — the deployment-stage parameter re-introduced when transaction costs make Coasean bargaining infeasible.
- The substrate audit is the corrective: re-enumerate the dropped terms and re-introduce each as an explicit parameter (a Pigouvian tax for unbargainable externalities, a liability rule chosen with bargaining cost in mind).
- Incentive
- In economics it is prices as incentives, Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, wage-and-commission structures, and patent systems rewarding R&D.
This sourceOriginating analysis of taxes and subsidies that internalize externalities by setting a per-unit charge equal to marginal external harm, flipping the marginal decider's calculus.
- In economics it is prices as incentives, Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, wage-and-commission structures, and patent systems rewarding R&D.
- Internalization
- Economics: An externality is internalized when a tax, property right, or merger makes a previously external cost or benefit appear inside the decision-maker's own accounting — a Pigouvian tax forces a polluter to carry the social cost of pollution as a private cost, so the external effect now sits inside the firm's optimization.
This sourceMacmillan. Originating exposition of externalities and corrective taxation: a tax equal to the marginal external damage makes a previously external social cost appear inside the producer's private accounting, "internalizing" the externality — supports the economic-internalization exemplar (Pigouvian tax).
- Economics: An externality is internalized when a tax, property right, or merger makes a previously external cost or benefit appear inside the decision-maker's own accounting — a Pigouvian tax forces a polluter to carry the social cost of pollution as a private cost, so the external effect now sits inside the firm's optimization.
- Price Discrimination
This sourceMacmillan. Originating exposition of externalities and corrective taxation: a tax equal to the marginal external damage makes a previously external social cost appear inside the producer's private accounting, "internalizing" the externality — supports the economic-internalization exemplar (Pigouvian tax).
- Price of Anarchy
- The bound is improvable by treating the game as a design variable: a marginal-cost toll on the narrow road shifts each driver's private cost to internalise the congestion externality, moving the equilibrium to the social optimum and driving the price of anarchy to $1$.
This sourceOriginates marginal-cost (Pigouvian) taxation to internalize a congestion externality, the toll that moves a selfish-routing equilibrium toward the social optimum.
- The bound is improvable by treating the game as a design variable: a marginal-cost toll on the narrow road shifts each driver's private cost to internalise the congestion externality, moving the equilibrium to the social optimum and driving the price of anarchy to $1$.
- Side Effect
- Externality theory's Pigouvian tradition transferred from economics into environmental regulation, tort law, and pollution-permit markets, all treating side effects as priceable externalities.
This sourceOriginates the analysis of externalities and the corrective (Pigouvian) tax that brings third-party costs onto the actor's ledger.
- Externality theory's Pigouvian tradition transferred from economics into environmental regulation, tort law, and pollution-permit markets, all treating side effects as priceable externalities.
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