A Comparison of Commercial and Military Computer Security Policies.

Clark, D. D., & Wilson, D. R. (1987). A Comparison of Commercial and Military Computer Security Policies. Proceedings of the 1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 184-194.

Type

Conference paper

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1987

DOI

10.1109/sp.1987.10001

Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10001

Cited from

law_governance, mathematics

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Confidentiality
  • The test cleanly excludes a common near-miss: public data protected only against alteration has an integrity requirement, not a confidentiality requirement, because there is no scope on use to exceed.

    This sourceEstablishes integrity as a policy goal in its own right, separable from any restriction on disclosure.

• Disjointness
  • In parallel computing, disjoint work units run without synchronization; in access control, separation-of-duties enforces disjoint roles.

    This sourceIntroduces separation of duties as a security mechanism enforcing disjoint roles, so that no single actor may both authorize and audit (commit and conceal) a transaction.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:79d4decd4bfa · see in the full table