A Comparison of Commercial and Military Computer Security Policies.

Clark, D. D., & Wilson, D. R. (1987). A Comparison of Commercial and Military Computer Security Policies. Proceedings of the 1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 184-194.

Type

Conference paper

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1987

Pages

184-194

DOI

10.1109/sp.1987.10001

DOI registrant

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10001

Cited from

law_governance, mathematics

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Confidentiality
  • The test cleanly excludes a common near-miss: public data protected only against alteration has an integrity requirement, not a confidentiality requirement, because there is no scope on use to exceed.

    This sourceEstablishes integrity as a policy goal in its own right, separable from any restriction on disclosure.

• Disjointness
  • In parallel computing, disjoint work units run without synchronization; in access control, separation-of-duties enforces disjoint roles.

    This sourceIntroduces separation of duties as a security mechanism enforcing disjoint roles, so that no single actor may both authorize and audit (commit and conceal) a transaction.

Verification

Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.

Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 2 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.

Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.

See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:79d4decd4bfa · see in the full table