Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?¶
Saez, E. (2010). Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(3), 180-212.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Banded Floor and Ceiling Rule
- Its signature failure is threshold clustering: actors pile up exactly at the rail rather than spreading naturally, a bunching effect familiar wherever a hard kink sits in a schedule.
This sourceShows that taxpayers cluster at kinks in a tax schedule, producing excess mass near the threshold.
- Its signature failure is threshold clustering: actors pile up exactly at the rail rather than spreading naturally, a bunching effect familiar wherever a hard kink sits in a schedule.
- Staged Threshold Rollout
- Because a known bar invites gaming, they also watch for transactions clustering just under it.
This sourceUses clustering around known policy thresholds to detect behavioral responses to the threshold.
- Because a known bar invites gaming, they also watch for transactions clustering just under it.
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