An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.

Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367-388.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1982

DOI

10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Other-Regarding Preferences
  • The empirical fact — responders routinely reject offers below roughly 20–30% of the pie, choosing zero over a small but unfair amount — falsifies that model and forces a cross-argument.

    This sourceOriginal ultimatum-game evidence that responders reject low (unfair) but positive offers.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:7a22c5b3fc5b · see in the full table