An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.¶
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367-388.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Other-Regarding Preferences
- The empirical fact — responders routinely reject offers below roughly 20–30% of the pie, choosing zero over a small but unfair amount — falsifies that model and forces a cross-argument.
This sourceOriginal ultimatum-game evidence that responders reject low (unfair) but positive offers.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Reports that ultimatum responders refused positive but low demands at a cost to themselves; the 20-30% threshold and the model-falsification step are not in this text.
“was refused at costs of DM 3 for player 2”
- The empirical fact — responders routinely reject offers below roughly 20–30% of the pie, choosing zero over a small but unfair amount — falsifies that model and forces a cross-argument.
Domain-specific¶
- Pirate game
- It is not a behavioural prediction about actual negotiators, who depart from it
This sourceThe first ultimatum-bargaining experiments, whose subjects departed from the subgame-perfect take-it-or-leave-it division; the game tested is the two-player ultimatum game, not the pirate game.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- It is not a behavioural prediction about actual negotiators, who depart from it
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
- That is precisely the point: a threat is exposed as empty by checking what the threatener would do at a node that never arises in equilibrium, not by what happens on the realized path. Not an empirically reliable prediction of behavior. Its predictions can and do fail — incumbents sometimes fight entry (the chain-store paradox), responders reject positive ultimatum offers
This sourceThe first experimental study of ultimatum bargaining.
- That is precisely the point: a threat is exposed as empty by checking what the threatener would do at a node that never arises in equilibrium, not by what happens on the realized path. Not an empirically reliable prediction of behavior. Its predictions can and do fail — incumbents sometimes fight entry (the chain-store paradox), responders reject positive ultimatum offers
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:7a22c5b3fc5b · see in the full table