The Costs and Benefits of Ownership

Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691-719.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1986

DOI

10.1086/261404

Link

https://doi.org/10.1086/261404

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incomplete Contract
  • Take the property-rights theory of the firm (the Grossman–Hart–Moore framework) as the rigorous instance, since it is where the prime received its sharpest formal treatment.

    This sourceDefines ownership as residual control rights — the authority to decide whatever the contract left open — and derives that residual control should go to the party whose non-contractible investment matters most.

• Transaction Costs
  • In contract theory, transaction costs motivate the study of incomplete contracts (

Verification

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