The Chain Store Paradox.¶
Selten, R. (1978). The Chain Store Paradox. Theory and Decision, 9(2), 127-159.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 4 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Credible Commitment
- The entry-deterrence game is the canonical game-theoretic instance, and it shows credibility as the literal content of subgame-perfect equilibrium.
This sourceThe canonical entry-deterrence analysis showing a bare fight-threat is not subgame-perfect (not credible) absent a commitment that alters execution-moment incentives.
- The entry-deterrence game is the canonical game-theoretic instance, and it shows credibility as the literal content of subgame-perfect equilibrium.
- Shadow Of The Future
- Critically, if the horizon is finite and commonly known, backward induction unravels cooperation from the last round forward, which is why an indefinite horizon (or observability carrying reputation to future partners) is structurally required.
This sourceShows backward induction unravels cooperation in finitely repeated games with a commonly known last round, motivating the indefinite-horizon requirement.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Abstract confirms only that finite repetitions of the prisoner's dilemma pose difficulties; it states nothing of backward induction's unraveling or the indefinite-horizon requirement.
“The chain store paradox throws new light on the well-known difficulties arising in connection with finite repetitions of the prisoners' dilemma game.”
- Critically, if the horizon is finite and commonly known, backward induction unravels cooperation from the last round forward, which is why an indefinite horizon (or observability carrying reputation to future partners) is structurally required.
Domain-specific¶
- Chainstore paradox
- The paradox depends on complete information finite horizon and sequential rationality, reputation effects can reappear under incomplete information or bounded rationality and fighting can be credible in altered payoff or commitment structures.
- … backward-induction subgame-perfect equilibrium, proposed deterrence reputation and its lack of credibility, incomplete-information resolution and distinction from commitment games are explicit. to An applied instance preserves the invariant under changed notation, scale, dataset, jurisdiction, or implementation..
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
- Stackelberg leader-follower competition in industrial organisation, and the chain-store paradox (Selten 1978)
This sourceSelten's chain-store game, in which game-theoretic induction reasoning conflicts with plausible behaviour toward entrants.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- Stackelberg leader-follower competition in industrial organisation, and the chain-store paradox (Selten 1978)
Verification¶
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Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 5 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
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