Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality

Maskin, E. (1999). Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 23-38.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1999

Volume

66

Issue

1

Pages

23-38

DOI registrant

Oxford University Press

Link

https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076matched

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

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Primes

• Incentive Compatibility

  • This sourceFoundational characterization of which social choice rules can be implemented in Nash equilibrium through rule design; cornerstone result in implementation theory linking multi-agent rule design to desired equilibrium outcomes.

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