The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization.

Mirrlees, J. A. (1976). The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization. Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1), 105-131.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1976

Link

https://www.jstor.org/stable/3003192

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

4 citations across 4 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Agency Problem

  • This sourceEarly contract-theoretic treatment of optimal incentive contracts within organizations; foundational for Holmström's work. Bibliography-only (tier C) — existence and venue verified; no body claim to support.

• Information Asymmetry
  • Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.
• Moral Hazard
  • The formalization by Arrow (1963) , Pauly (1968) , Mirrlees (1971–75)
• Risk Pooling
  • Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.

Verification

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