Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem.

Myerson, R. B. (1979). Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 61-73.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1979

DOI

10.2307/1911285

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility
  • This matters especially in distributed or private-information settings, where no central authority can verify each agent's type or action.
• Mechanism Design
  • Anti-collusion design (bid increments, secrecy rules, random audits) must be bolted on because the clean theorem does not cover the relevant threats.

Domain-specific

• Bayesian Optimal Mechanism
  • The revelation principle often permits analysis of direct mechanisms, shifting the problem from inventing every possible game form to choosing truthful allocation and payment rules.

    This sourceFoundational Bayesian incentive-compatibility and direct-revelation reduction.

Verification

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://doi.org/10.2307/1911285 ×1

Registry ID ref:7f0d003b9b9d · see in the full table