Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem.

Myerson, R. B. (1979). Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 47(1), 61-73.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1979

Volume

47

Issue

1

Pages

61-73

DOI

10.2307/1911285

DOI registrant

JSTOR

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

4 citations across 4 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Incentive Compatibility
  • The revelation principle, formalized by Myerson (1979)
• Mechanism Design
  • Anti-collusion design (bid increments, secrecy rules, random audits) must be bolted on because the clean theorem does not cover the relevant threats.

Domain-specific

• Bayesian Optimal Mechanism
  • The revelation principle often permits analysis of direct mechanisms, shifting the problem from inventing every possible game form to choosing truthful allocation and payment rules.

    This sourceFoundational Bayesian incentive-compatibility and direct-revelation reduction.

Mechanisms

• Mechanism Design Protocol
  • It is the general procedure behind the whole archetype, and its formal core is the insight that you can, without loss, design rules under which participants find it best to reveal their private information truthfully.

    This sourceStates the revelation principle: incentive-compatible mechanisms can be represented so that truthful reporting is optimal.

Verification

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://doi.org/10.2307/1911285 ×1

Registry ID ref:7f0d003b9b9d · see in the full table