Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning.¶
Hohfeld, W. N. (1913). Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. Yale Law Journal, 23(1), 16-59.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Information Use License
- A rule that only forbids is a restriction; a license is recognizable because a party is positively authorized to do something with information it would otherwise have had no standing to use.
This sourceSeparates privilege - the jural position of being free to act - from claim-right, duty, power and immunity, supplying the vocabulary in which an affirmative grant of permitted acts is distinguished from a bare prohibition.
- A rule that only forbids is a restriction; a license is recognizable because a party is positively authorized to do something with information it would otherwise have had no standing to use.
- Latent Realizable Capacity
- In law and institutional design it is legal powers — to make a will, to vote, to bind an organization — and dormant authority such as a vice-president's capacity to assume the presidency on succession.
This sourceCanonical analysis of legal powers (the capacity to alter legal relations — make a will, vote, bind an organization) as standing jural positions distinct from their exercise.
- In law and institutional design it is legal powers — to make a will, to vote, to bind an organization — and dormant authority such as a vice-president's capacity to assume the presidency on succession.
- Property Rights
- Hohfeld's analysis of jural relations clarified that each of these strands is a relation between persons with respect to a thing, not a relation between a person and the thing itself; a property right is always a claim that others have a correlative duty to respect.
This sourceFoundational decomposition of jural relations showing that a right is a relation between persons (a claim with a correlative duty), not a relation between a person and a thing — the basis for treating a property right as an enforceable claim others have a duty to respect.
- Hohfeld's analysis of jural relations clarified that each of these strands is a relation between persons with respect to a thing, not a relation between a person and the thing itself; a property right is always a claim that others have a correlative duty to respect.
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