Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions.¶
Anderson, E. (2012). Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. Social Epistemology, 26(2), 163-173.
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Primes¶
- Epistemic Justice
- how hearers distribute trust and conceptual frameworks, typically tracked through identity-markers or structural locations (gender, race, disability, lay-professional asymmetries); and (4) the locus of injustice: structural versus individual
This sourceArgues that group-based credibility deficits require structural, institution-level responses rather than only individual virtue, since cumulative effects of an epistemic system can be unjust even when no single transaction is.
- how hearers distribute trust and conceptual frameworks, typically tracked through identity-markers or structural locations (gender, race, disability, lay-professional asymmetries); and (4) the locus of injustice: structural versus individual
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