Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions

Palsule-Desai, O. D. (2015). Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions.

Type

Unclassified

Intellectual base

Unclassified

Year

2015

DOI

10.1142/s021919891540006x

Link

https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891540006x

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Domain-specific

• Non-cooperative game theory
  • Non-cooperative does not mean players never coordinate; cooperation can emerge endogenously when strategies, communication, repetition and enforcement are represented inside the game.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:8208bd400bd5 · see in the full table