The Credit Ratings Game¶
BOLTON, P., FREIXAS, X., & SHAPIRO, J. (2012). The Credit Ratings Game. The Journal of Finance, 67(1), 85-111.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Trusted Third-Party Attestation
- The structural trap is the issuer-pays conflict — the very party being vouched for chooses and pays the voucher, quietly bending the opinion toward its interest.
This sourceModels issuer-paid rating shopping as a conflict of interest that gives rating agencies incentives to inflate ratings in order to attract business.
- The structural trap is the issuer-pays conflict — the very party being vouched for chooses and pays the voucher, quietly bending the opinion toward its interest.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Not recorded. The single citation of this work carries no recorded support check.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:820bf22f633a · see in the full table