Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations¶
Shapiro, C. (1983). Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(4), 659-679.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Reputation
- Economics & markets: Brand reputation lets buyers infer unobservable quality before purchase; firms invest in costly-to-build, easy-to-destroy reputational capital precisely because the anticipated stream of repeat business disciplines present quality, the quality-assurance role Shapiro (1983) modeled by showing that a reputation premium can support prices above marginal cost as a bond against cheating.
This sourceDerives an equilibrium price-quality schedule in which a reputation premium supports prices above marginal cost as a bond against quality-cutting.
- Economics & markets: Brand reputation lets buyers infer unobservable quality before purchase; firms invest in costly-to-build, easy-to-destroy reputational capital precisely because the anticipated stream of repeat business disciplines present quality, the quality-assurance role Shapiro (1983) modeled by showing that a reputation premium can support prices above marginal cost as a bond against cheating.
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