Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation.¶
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1988). Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica, 56(4), 755-785.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Completeness
- … are well-documented in the law-and-economics literature on incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore 1988; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995, with the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel awarded to Hart and Holmström in 2016 for their work on contract theory including incomplete contracts).
This sourceFoundational paper on the economic theory of incomplete contracts; subsequent development by Hart (Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press, 1995) and the 2016 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström.
- … are well-documented in the law-and-economics literature on incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore 1988; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995, with the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel awarded to Hart and Holmström in 2016 for their work on contract theory including incomplete contracts).
- Contract
- This is a substantial complexity saving: the cost of coordinating \(n\) parties drops from maintaining their pairwise expectations to maintaining one shared specification
This sourceFoundational incomplete-contracting theory: no contract foresees every contingency, formalizing the completeness trade-off and the role of renegotiation.
- This is a substantial complexity saving: the cost of coordinating \(n\) parties drops from maintaining their pairwise expectations to maintaining one shared specification
- Incomplete Contract
- An incomplete contract is the structural pattern of a rule-set that deliberately leaves some contingencies unspecified, in the knowledge that exhaustive enumeration is impossible, prohibitively costly, or unenforceable, and that some other mechanism — residual control rights, renegotiation, default doctrines, trusted arbiters, norms, or good faith — will fill the gap when the unspecified contingency arises.
This sourceFoundational formalization of contracts that deliberately leave contingencies unspecified because exhaustive enumeration is impossible, with renegotiation and residual control filling the gap.
- An incomplete contract is the structural pattern of a rule-set that deliberately leaves some contingencies unspecified, in the knowledge that exhaustive enumeration is impossible, prohibitively costly, or unenforceable, and that some other mechanism — residual control rights, renegotiation, default doctrines, trusted arbiters, norms, or good faith — will fill the gap when the unspecified contingency arises.
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