Doing It Now or Later.¶
O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing It Now or Later. American Economic Review, 89(1), 103-124.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Commitment Device
- O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) sharpened this by distinguishing "sophisticated" agents, who foresee their own future present-bias and therefore demand commitment, from "naïve" agents, who do not foresee it and so never reach for the device at all — making the perception of the conflict the hinge on which commitment turns.
This sourceDistinguishes 'sophisticated' agents who foresee their own future present-bias (and therefore demand commitment) from 'naive' agents who do not; supports the clarity-section claim that perceiving the present/future-self conflict is the hinge on which commitment turns.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The 1999 paper's own abstract confirms the sophisticated/naive distinction about future self-control problems, but not that sophisticated agents demand commitment or that naïve agents never seek the device.
“We emphasize two distinctions: Do activities involve immediate costs or immediate rewards, and are people sophisticated or naive about future self-control problems? Naive people procrastinate immediate-cost activities and preproperate—do too soon—immediate-reward activities. Sophistication mitigates procrastination, but exacerbates preproperation.”
- O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) sharpened this by distinguishing "sophisticated" agents, who foresee their own future present-bias and therefore demand commitment, from "naïve" agents, who do not foresee it and so never reach for the device at all — making the perception of the conflict the hinge on which commitment turns.
- Temporal Inconsistency and Preference Reversals
- It clarifies that the problem is not the agent's intelligence or honesty, but a structural property of how humans value outcomes across time, as O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) emphasize in their analysis of present-biased preferences and procrastination.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract models self-control problems as time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences and treats procrastination as a consequence, but it never states the contrast with intelligence or honesty.
“We examine self-control problems—modeled as time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences—in a model where a person must do an activity exactly once.”
- It clarifies that the problem is not the agent's intelligence or honesty, but a structural property of how humans value outcomes across time, as O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) emphasize in their analysis of present-biased preferences and procrastination.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 2 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:850c0d7c0671 · see in the full table