Games with incomplete information played by 'Bayesian' players.¶
Harsanyi, J. C. (. (1968). Games with incomplete information played by 'Bayesian' players. Management Science, 14(3), 159-182.
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Primes¶
- Game-Theoretic Strategy
- … randomisation at each information set), or correlated (joint randomisation through a public signal); (3) the solution concept that justifies the strategy — Nash equilibrium, dominant-strategy equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium for sequential games, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for incomplete-information games
This source(The originating treatment of Bayesian games and Bayesian-Nash equilibrium — the framework for analysing games of incomplete information by introducing a "type" for each player drawn from a commonly known prior distribution. Harsanyi shared the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize with Nash and Selten for this work, which made auction theory, mechanism design, and the modern theory of asymmetric-information markets analytically tractable.)
- … randomisation at each information set), or correlated (joint randomisation through a public signal); (3) the solution concept that justifies the strategy — Nash equilibrium, dominant-strategy equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium for sequential games, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for incomplete-information games
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