Example of a Finite Game with No Berge Equilibria at All.

Crettez, B. (2019). Example of a Finite Game with No Berge Equilibria at All. Games.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2019

DOI

10.3390/g10010007

DOI registrant

MDPI AG

Link

https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010007

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Domain-specific

• Berge–Zhukovskii Equilibrium
  • Not automatically existent in mixed strategies. Finite games can lack Berge–Zhukovskii equilibrium even when mixing is allowed, so Nash's general finite-game existence theorem must not be imported.

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Registry ID ref:8658acee0cb9 · see in the full table