Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders¶
Glosten, L. R., & Milgrom, P. R. (1985). Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 71-100.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Liquidity
- This mirrors a structural finding from market microstructure: Glosten and Milgrom (1985) showed that bid-ask spreads emerge as compensation for the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders, so that the liquidity of any market—or any knowledge system—is governed by the cost of resolving who knows what, not by raw volume of holdings.
This sourceSequential-trade model in which bid-ask spreads emerge as compensation for information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders; establishes the canonical link between information environment and liquidity.
- This mirrors a structural finding from market microstructure: Glosten and Milgrom (1985) showed that bid-ask spreads emerge as compensation for the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders, so that the liquidity of any market—or any knowledge system—is governed by the cost of resolving who knows what, not by raw volume of holdings.
Mechanisms¶
- Market-Microstructure Order-Book Probe
- Informed order flow leaving a footprint in spreads
This sourceShows that informed trading leaves an observable footprint by generating a positive bid–ask spread.
- Informed order flow leaving a footprint in spreads
Verification¶
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