The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare¶
Sugden, R. (1986). The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- Game theory and economics — equilibrium selection in repeated games and the evolutionary dynamics of market entry, pricing conventions, and oligopoly behavior. Norms, conventions, language — a social convention (driving side, currency choice, language standardization) is an ESS if defectors are worse off in a population using the convention.
This sourceUses evolutionary game theory to show how self-enforcing conventions (property, reciprocity, coordination such as which side to drive on) evolve and persist because a deviator is worse off in a population already following the convention — a convention-as-ESS account.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The publisher abstract confirms Sugden uses evolutionary game theory to explain how conventions evolve and become moral norms, but it does not state the ESS condition or the game-theory applications.
“Robert Sugden shows how conventions of property, mutual aid, and voluntary supply of public goods can evolve spontaneously out of the interactions of self-interested individuals, and can become moral norms. Sugden was among the first social scientists to use evolutionary game theory.”
- Game theory and economics — equilibrium selection in repeated games and the evolutionary dynamics of market entry, pricing conventions, and oligopoly behavior. Norms, conventions, language — a social convention (driving side, currency choice, language standardization) is an ESS if defectors are worse off in a population using the convention.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:86eae62c3126 · see in the full table