The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare¶
Sugden, R. (1986). The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- Game theory and economics — equilibrium selection in repeated games and the evolutionary dynamics of market entry, pricing conventions, and oligopoly behavior. Norms, conventions, language — a social convention (driving side, currency choice, language standardization) is an ESS if defectors are worse off in a population using the convention.
This sourceUses evolutionary game theory to show how self-enforcing conventions (property, reciprocity, coordination such as which side to drive on) evolve and persist because a deviator is worse off in a population already following the convention — a convention-as-ESS account.
- Game theory and economics — equilibrium selection in repeated games and the evolutionary dynamics of market entry, pricing conventions, and oligopoly behavior. Norms, conventions, language — a social convention (driving side, currency choice, language standardization) is an ESS if defectors are worse off in a population using the convention.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:86eae62c3126 · see in the full table