Being and Time¶
Heidegger, M. (. (1962). Being and Time.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Alienation
- … of modernity** (following Durkheim on anomie, Weber on rationalization, Tönnies on Gemeinschaft-to-Gesellschaft transition) applies it to bureaucratic iron-cage conditions, urban anonymity, and the psychological effects of mass society. Existential and phenomenological philosophy (Heidegger's Being and Time
This sourceHarper & Row. Analyzes fallenness (Verfallen) and absorption in das Man as inauthentic self-loss, grounding existential alienation (Entfremdung) in the structure of facticity rather than in capitalism.
- … of modernity** (following Durkheim on anomie, Weber on rationalization, Tönnies on Gemeinschaft-to-Gesellschaft transition) applies it to bureaucratic iron-cage conditions, urban anonymity, and the psychological effects of mass society. Existential and phenomenological philosophy (Heidegger's Being and Time
- Hermeneutic Circle
- The Hermeneutic Circle is the interpretive principle that (1) understanding the meaning of a whole (text, event, corpus, historical period, codebase) requires understanding its parts, while understanding the meaning of each part requires reference to its place in the whole, (2) the interpreter enters this relationship with prior expectations (the Heideggerian fore-structure)
This sourceHarper & Row. Develops the hermeneutic-circle account in which all interpretation is grounded in a prior fore-structure (fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception) that determines what can show up as meaningful.
- The Hermeneutic Circle is the interpretive principle that (1) understanding the meaning of a whole (text, event, corpus, historical period, codebase) requires understanding its parts, while understanding the meaning of each part requires reference to its place in the whole, (2) the interpreter enters this relationship with prior expectations (the Heideggerian fore-structure)
- Interpretation
- … vector of representation, and it cannot be performed except against some framework that determines which candidate readings even count — a point Heidegger (1927) develops by arguing that interpretation always rests on a fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception that determines what can show up as meaningful.
This sourceHarper & Row. Develops the hermeneutic-circle account in which all interpretation is grounded in a prior fore-structure (fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception) that determines what can show up as meaningful.
- … vector of representation, and it cannot be performed except against some framework that determines which candidate readings even count — a point Heidegger (1927) develops by arguing that interpretation always rests on a fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception that determines what can show up as meaningful.
- Ontology
- Heidegger's 1927 phenomenological ontology offers the continental counterpart: an inquiry into Being itself (Sein), not merely what exists, pursued through the structure of human existence (Dasein) as the entity for which Being is at stake.
This sourceHarper & Row. Develops the hermeneutic-circle account in which all interpretation is grounded in a prior fore-structure (fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception) that determines what can show up as meaningful.
- Heidegger's 1927 phenomenological ontology offers the continental counterpart: an inquiry into Being itself (Sein), not merely what exists, pursued through the structure of human existence (Dasein) as the entity for which Being is at stake.
- Phenomenology
- Every phenomenological claim specifies: (1) the experiencing subject (transcendental ego in Husserl; embodied subject in Merleau-Ponty); (2) the intentional content, the noema (what experience is about); (3) the conscious act, the noesis (the experiencing itself); and (4) the methodological epoché
This sourceHarper & Row. Develops the hermeneutic-circle account in which all interpretation is grounded in a prior fore-structure (fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception) that determines what can show up as meaningful.
- Every phenomenological claim specifies: (1) the experiencing subject (transcendental ego in Husserl; embodied subject in Merleau-Ponty); (2) the intentional content, the noema (what experience is about); (3) the conscious act, the noesis (the experiencing itself); and (4) the methodological epoché
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