Central-Bank Independence Revisited.¶
Fischer, S. (1995). Central-Bank Independence Revisited. American Economic Review, 85(2), 201-206.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Autonomy
- The boundary over a matter is sharply scoped: the bank governs the policy instrument (the short-term interest rate) while the government retains the goal (the inflation target).
This sourceDraws the instrument-independence/goal-dependence distinction — the bank governs the policy instrument while the government retains the goal — the scope-versus-depth split.
- The boundary over a matter is sharply scoped: the bank governs the policy instrument (the short-term interest rate) while the government retains the goal (the inflation target).
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