Choice and Consequence¶
Schelling, T. C. (1984). Choice and Consequence. Harvard University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Temporal Inconsistency and Preference Reversals
- This structure appears in savings accounts with withdrawal penalties, gym contracts with steep cancellation fees, signed agreements with enforcement clauses, and environmental design that removes temptation at the moment of decision.
This sourceDevelops the strategic logic of self-command and pre-commitment: agents anticipating future preference reversals can rationally bind themselves through contracts, penalty clauses, and removal of choice at the moment of temptation.
- This structure appears in savings accounts with withdrawal penalties, gym contracts with steep cancellation fees, signed agreements with enforcement clauses, and environmental design that removes temptation at the moment of decision.
Verification¶
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