Secure Audit Logs to Support Computer Forensics.¶
Schneier, B., & Kelsey, J. (1999). Secure Audit Logs to Support Computer Forensics. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2(2), 159-176.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Credible Commitment
- Software and AI safety. Hard-coded refusals, append-only logs, and immutable audit trails are technical commitments — the system cannot misbehave even if instructed to, removing the question of whether it will.
This sourceEstablishes append-only, tamper-evident logging in which prior entries cannot be modified or destroyed undetectably — a technical commitment device that removes the question of whether a system will be altered after the fact.
- Software and AI safety. Hard-coded refusals, append-only logs, and immutable audit trails are technical commitments — the system cannot misbehave even if instructed to, removing the question of whether it will.
Mechanisms¶
- Audit Log and Trace
- The guarding discipline is to make the log feed enforcement and review rather than substitute for them, and to scrub or tier sensitive fields so the record stays trustworthy without becoming its own hazard.
This sourceIt is the standard reference for making a trace trustworthy enough to enforce accountability on, rather than a log that could be quietly rewritten.
- The guarding discipline is to make the log feed enforcement and review rather than substitute for them, and to scrub or tier sensitive fields so the record stays trustworthy without becoming its own hazard.
Verification¶
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