Explaining Bargaining Impasse¶
Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1997). Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1).
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Primes¶
- Bargaining Power
- Each side supplies a rationale — cost pressure, fairness, precedent, prevailing market rates — and these rationales are shaped by the position at least as much as they shape it, though experimental work on self-serving fairness judgements finds they can also drive a negotiation to impasse rather than merely decorate one.
This sourceShows that assessments of a fair settlement are biased by the role a party occupies, and that this role-induced rationale is itself a measurable cause of costly delay and impasse.
- Each side supplies a rationale — cost pressure, fairness, precedent, prevailing market rates — and these rationales are shaped by the position at least as much as they shape it, though experimental work on self-serving fairness judgements finds they can also drive a negotiation to impasse rather than merely decorate one.
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