Evaluation of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game Theoretic Approaches for Water Allocation of Transboundary Rivers¶
Mirzaei-Nodoushan, F., Bozorg-Haddad, O., & Loáiciga, H. A. (2022). Evaluation of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game Theoretic Approaches for Water Allocation of Transboundary Rivers. Scientific Reports, 12.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Non-Zero-Sum Game
- Reframed as non-zero-sum, a treaty allocates rights conditional on conservation investment, and both end with more usable water at lower infrastructure cost.
This sourceShows that cooperative (non-zero-sum) allocation of a shared transboundary river yields greater total benefit to all riparian states than non-cooperative capture, the source for the river-water example.
- Reframed as non-zero-sum, a treaty allocates rights conditional on conservation investment, and both end with more usable water at lower infrastructure cost.
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