Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses¶
Cournot, A. A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Anti-Commons Tragedy
- Each holder, treating the others' royalties as fixed, prices its slice to capture as much surplus as it can — the holdout incentive — and because every holder reasons the same way, the summed royalties can exceed \(V\) even though a coordinated single owner would price the bundle to clear.
This sourceOriginates the complementary-monopoly (Cournot-complements) result (Chapter IX): independent owners of complementary goods each set prices that sum above the joint-optimal price, the formal engine of anticommons under-use.
- Each holder, treating the others' royalties as fixed, prices its slice to capture as much surplus as it can — the holdout incentive — and because every holder reasons the same way, the summed royalties can exceed \(V\) even though a coordinated single owner would price the bundle to clear.
- Strategic Substitute
- Market price falls with total output: \(p = a - b(q_1 + q_2)\).
This sourceIntroduces the duopoly quantity-competition model with linear demand p = a − b(q1+q2), downward-sloping reaction functions, and the unique interior equilibrium q1 = q2 = (a−c)/(3b) — the canonical submodular game.
- Market price falls with total output: \(p = a - b(q_1 + q_2)\).
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