Safety-I and Safety-II¶
Hollnagel, E. (2014). Safety-I and Safety-II: The Past and Future of Safety Management. Ashgate Publishing.
Cited by¶
9 citations across 9 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Boundedness
- Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.
- Containment
This sourceContrasts reactive (Safety-I) and proactive (Safety-II) approaches to managing high-risk systems.
- Fail-Safe
- The distinction between fail-safe (safe state on failure) and fail-secure (locked-down state on failure) as contextual design choices
This sourceContrasts Safety-I (avoiding things that go wrong) with Safety-II (ensuring things go right) and frames context-dependent safety judgments. NOTE: Hollnagel does not use the 'fail-safe/fail-secure' terminology directly; it supports the broader claim that what counts as 'safe' is context- and hazard-dependent rather than the specific lexical pair (see flag).
- The distinction between fail-safe (safe state on failure) and fail-secure (locked-down state on failure) as contextual design choices
- Procedure-Work Mismatch
- Hollnagel's "work-as-imagined versus work-as-done" is the canonical articulation
This sourceCanonical articulation of work-as-imagined versus work-as-done and of procedures as resources for action rather than recipes for action.
- Hollnagel's "work-as-imagined versus work-as-done" is the canonical articulation
- Resilience
- Envelope-mechanism focus: Concentrates attention on envelope and mechanism rather than every possible failure mode; specifying what disturbances are absorbed and by what mechanism bounds the design and analysis effort, as Hollnagel (2014) argues in Safety-I and Safety-II against exhaustive failure-mode enumeration
This sourceAshgate. Argues that safety management should focus on the envelope of normal performance variability and adaptive mechanisms rather than on exhaustive enumeration of failure modes; reframes resilience as the capacity to succeed under varying conditions.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
This page backs Hollnagel's shift from enumerating failure modes to ensuring things go right; it does not state the envelope/mechanism or effort-bounding clause.
“Focusing on what goes right, rather than on what goes wrong, changes the definition of safety from ’avoiding that something goes wrong’ to ’ensuring that everything goes right’. More precisely, Safety-II is the ability to succeed under varying conditions, so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes is as high as possible.”
- Envelope-mechanism focus: Concentrates attention on envelope and mechanism rather than every possible failure mode; specifying what disturbances are absorbed and by what mechanism bounds the design and analysis effort, as Hollnagel (2014) argues in Safety-I and Safety-II against exhaustive failure-mode enumeration
- Responsibility Diffusion
- Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.
Mechanisms¶
- Actual-vs-Documented Process Map
- Its central limitation is that a map is a simplification of a moving reality — the divergence between work-as-imagined and work-as-done is real and worth showing
This sourceDistinguishes work-as-imagined from work-as-done and treats the divergence as substantive and consequential.
- Its central limitation is that a map is a simplification of a moving reality — the divergence between work-as-imagined and work-as-done is real and worth showing
- Practitioner Counterfactual Walkthrough
- This is the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done
This sourceDistinguishes work-as-imagined in procedures and plans from work-as-done under actual operating conditions.
- This is the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done
- Workaround Discovery
- Its strength is resilience: it is how real systems keep functioning when the designed path fails, and it takes seriously the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done — the ingenuity operators supply to keep goals alive under conditions the designers never anticipated.
This sourceDefines Safety-II as resilient success under varying conditions and distinguishes work-as-imagined from work-as-done, where people adjust performance to sustain operations.
- Its strength is resilience: it is how real systems keep functioning when the designed path fails, and it takes seriously the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done — the ingenuity operators supply to keep goals alive under conditions the designers never anticipated.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This work's DOI is recorded above but has not been resolved against an external catalogue, so nothing here confirms the work exists.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 9 citations: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 2 other ways.
- https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/en/publications/safety-i-and-safety-ii-the-past-and-future-of-safety-management/ ×1
- https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.1201/9781315607511/safety-safety-ii-erik-hollnagel ×1
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