Discretionary Disclosure Strategies in Corporate Narratives¶
Merkl-Davies, D. M., & Brennan, N. M. (2007). Discretionary Disclosure Strategies in Corporate Narratives: Incremental Information or Impression Management?. Journal of Accounting Literature, 26, 116-196.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Structural Filtering
- In corporate communication, legal review, brand discipline, audience composition, competitive sensitivity, and regulatory exposure jointly filter what a corporation will say, producing the bland, qualified output recognizable across all large corporations.
This sourceSynthesizes evidence that corporate narrative disclosures are filtered under impression-management incentives (concealment, readability/obfuscation, attribution), producing the hedged, qualified register characteristic of corporate communication regardless of who staffs it.
- In corporate communication, legal review, brand discipline, audience composition, competitive sensitivity, and regulatory exposure jointly filter what a corporation will say, producing the bland, qualified output recognizable across all large corporations.
Verification¶
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Does it back the claim? Not recorded. The single citation of this work carries no recorded support check.
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