On the Rule of Law¶
Tamanaha, B. Z. (2004). On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- No One Is Above the Rules
- This dimension emphasizes prospectivity and publicity: rules must be announced in advance so actors can conform behavior, and their application must be visible rather than arbitrary, requirements Tamanaha (2004) traces from classical antiquity through modern formal and substantive theories of the rule of law.
This sourceComprehensive intellectual history tracing rule-of-law concepts from Aristotle through medieval, early modern, and contemporary thought; distinguishes formal versions (legality, prospectivity, publicity, generality) from substantive versions tied to rights and democracy.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Tamanaha's abstract confirms a historical sweep from classical Greek and Roman ideas through medieval and liberal theory, and a two-stream (formal vs substantive) treatment, but it nowhere names prospectivity or publicity.
“This 2004 book explores the history, politics, and theory surrounding the rule of law ideal, beginning with classical Greek and Roman ideas, elaborating on medieval contributions to the rule of law, and articulating the role played by the rule of law in liberal theory and liberal political systems. ... Two basic theoretical streams of the rule of law are then presented, with an examination of the strengths and …”
- This dimension emphasizes prospectivity and publicity: rules must be announced in advance so actors can conform behavior, and their application must be visible rather than arbitrary, requirements Tamanaha (2004) traces from classical antiquity through modern formal and substantive theories of the rule of law.
- Rule of Law
- Tamanaha (2004) traces this conflation through the history of legal theory and emphasizes that what marks rule-of-law systems off from rule-by-law systems is not the presence of rules but the reflexive binding of officials by the rules they administer.
This sourceComprehensive intellectual history tracing rule-of-law concepts from Aristotle through medieval, early modern, and contemporary thought; distinguishes formal versions (legality, prospectivity, publicity, generality) from substantive versions tied to rights and democracy.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Supplies the intellectual-history frame for Tamanaha's treatment of the rule of law, but its abstract states no criterion of officials being reflexively bound by the rules they administer.
“This 2004 book explores the history, politics, and theory surrounding the rule of law ideal, beginning with classical Greek and Roman ideas, elaborating on medieval contributions to the rule of law, and articulating the role played by the rule of law in liberal theory and liberal political systems.”
- Tamanaha (2004) traces this conflation through the history of legal theory and emphasizes that what marks rule-of-law systems off from rule-by-law systems is not the presence of rules but the reflexive binding of officials by the rules they administer.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 2 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
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