The Theory of Industrial Organization¶
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.
Cited by¶
8 citations across 8 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Diseconomies of Scale
- Diseconomies of scale is the structural pattern in which the per-unit cost or per-unit performance of a system worsens as the system grows past some size, because the overhead of coordinating, connecting, or supplying a larger whole rises faster than the output it adds.
This sourceCanonical industrial-organization text developing the firm's cost function and the determinants of scale economies and diseconomies; supports the framing of the diseconomy as a regime in which per-unit cost rises with size as coordination and organizational overhead outpace added output.
- Diseconomies of scale is the structural pattern in which the per-unit cost or per-unit performance of a system worsens as the system grows past some size, because the overhead of coordinating, connecting, or supplying a larger whole rises faster than the output it adds.
- Economies of Scale
- In healthcare, integrated delivery networks and multi-hospital systems invoke scale economies for administrative overhead, capital equipment, IT platforms, and purchasing; whether these are real or merely claimed is an active research question, and Tirole (1988) provides the standard industrial-organization framework for separating genuine cost-curve effects from market-power-rationalizing rhetoric.
This sourceCanonical industrial-organization text developing the firm's cost function and the determinants of scale economies and diseconomies, and the market-structure consequences (from natural competition to natural monopoly)
- In healthcare, integrated delivery networks and multi-hospital systems invoke scale economies for administrative overhead, capital equipment, IT platforms, and purchasing; whether these are real or merely claimed is an active research question, and Tirole (1988) provides the standard industrial-organization framework for separating genuine cost-curve effects from market-power-rationalizing rhetoric.
- First Mover Advantage
- And the prime situates first-mover analysis as the most-studied member of a broader family of sequence-sensitive games (signalling, Stackelberg leadership, dynamic auctions) whose vocabulary ports across.
This sourceStandard graduate treatment of strategic interaction including Stackelberg leadership, entry/preemption, and other sequence-sensitive oligopoly games whose vocabulary situates first-mover analysis within a broader family.
- And the prime situates first-mover analysis as the most-studied member of a broader family of sequence-sensitive games (signalling, Stackelberg leadership, dynamic auctions) whose vocabulary ports across.
- Marginal Analysis
- The framework has been refined (partial equilibrium supplemented by general-equilibrium analysis per Arrow-Debreu 1954; perfect-competition assumptions relaxed through game-theoretic industrial-organization analysis;
This sourceCanonical industrial-organization text: develops the firm's cost function and the determinants of scale economies and diseconomies, defining the diseconomy as a regime in which per-unit cost rises with size as coordination and organizational overhead outpace added output.
- The framework has been refined (partial equilibrium supplemented by general-equilibrium analysis per Arrow-Debreu 1954; perfect-competition assumptions relaxed through game-theoretic industrial-organization analysis;
- Monopoly
- The single controlling locus is one firm; the controlled resource is a good for which the no-close-substitute condition holds, so the firm faces the entire downward-sloping market demand curve rather than a flat competitive one.
This sourceStandard treatment of monopoly pricing: the single seller faces the whole downward-sloping demand curve, sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, prices above marginal cost, and creates deadweight loss.
- The single controlling locus is one firm; the controlled resource is a good for which the no-close-substitute condition holds, so the firm faces the entire downward-sloping market demand curve rather than a flat competitive one.
- Price Discrimination
This sourceCanonical industrial-organization text: develops the firm's cost function and the determinants of scale economies and diseconomies, defining the diseconomy as a regime in which per-unit cost rises with size as coordination and organizational overhead outpace added output.
- Sunk Cost and Irreversible Commitment
- One can be path-dependent without sunk costs (a technical choice that is hard to reverse for structural reasons); one can experience sunk-cost effects without path-dependent lock-in (a relationship where emotional investment is high but exit is technically easy), a separation Tirole (1988) maintains in the rational-actor treatment of sunk-cost competition and entry barriers.
This sourceCanonical industrial-organization text: develops the firm's cost function and the determinants of scale economies and diseconomies, defining the diseconomy as a regime in which per-unit cost rises with size as coordination and organizational overhead outpace added output.
- One can be path-dependent without sunk costs (a technical choice that is hard to reverse for structural reasons); one can experience sunk-cost effects without path-dependent lock-in (a relationship where emotional investment is high but exit is technically easy), a separation Tirole (1988) maintains in the rational-actor treatment of sunk-cost competition and entry barriers.
Domain-specific¶
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