Transactions costs in organizations with trust.¶
Bromiley, P., & Cummings, L. L. (1995). Transactions costs in organizations with trust. Research on Negotiation in Organizations, 5, 219-250.
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Primes¶
- Exchange
- Bromiley and Cummings (1995) document trust itself as a substitute enforcement frame that reduces transaction costs in asymmetric exchanges without formal contracting, locating the intervention point on whichever role the asymmetry sits on rather than treating the friction as undifferentiated.
This sourceTreats trust as a substitute/complement for formal contracting: transaction costs are partly a function of the probability of opportunism, which falls with trust, reducing the costs of specifying terms, monitoring, and enforcement in asymmetric exchanges.
- Bromiley and Cummings (1995) document trust itself as a substitute enforcement frame that reduces transaction costs in asymmetric exchanges without formal contracting, locating the intervention point on whichever role the asymmetry sits on rather than treating the friction as undifferentiated.
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