Arms and Influence¶
Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Brinkmanship
- The pattern also appears in litigation, where each procedural step raises both parties' costs and the probability of a mutually catastrophic verdict; in climate negotiations, where a threatened defection raises the probability of regime collapse; in hostile takeovers with a clock and a walk-away price; in military escalation ladders designed as probability ramps; and in hostage negotiations, where deadlines and partial actions raise the probability of harm without crossing the irreversible line.
This sourceExtends the manipulation-of-risk and commitment analysis across coercive bargaining — deterrence, compellence, escalation, and the 'competition in risk-taking' — supporting the cross-domain recurrence of brinkmanship structure in strategic contests.
- The pattern also appears in litigation, where each procedural step raises both parties' costs and the probability of a mutually catastrophic verdict; in climate negotiations, where a threatened defection raises the probability of regime collapse; in hostile takeovers with a clock and a walk-away price; in military escalation ladders designed as probability ramps; and in hostage negotiations, where deadlines and partial actions raise the probability of harm without crossing the irreversible line.
- Coercion
- It is the common parent of two structurally inverted instruments: compellence, which forces a positive action (do X) by imposing continuing costs until compliance, and deterrence, which forces restraint (do not do X) by arranging costs conditional on the proscribed action.
This sourceCoins "compellence" and distinguishes it from deterrence; develops the theory of coercion as the manipulation of risk and cost through credible threats — the parent structure for both directions.
- It is the common parent of two structurally inverted instruments: compellence, which forces a positive action (do X) by imposing continuing costs until compliance, and deterrence, which forces restraint (do not do X) by arranging costs conditional on the proscribed action.
- Compellence
- International relations (origin): coercive bombing demanding withdrawal, blockades demanding policy change, sanctions regimes demanding behaviour change — the 1962 Cuban quarantine was compellence (force missile withdrawal), not deterrence.
This sourceIntroduces and develops the concept of compellence as distinct from deterrence, analyzing continuing pressure, the difficulty of forcing visible action, and the Cuban Missile Crisis as a compellent episode. (
- International relations (origin): coercive bombing demanding withdrawal, blockades demanding policy change, sanctions regimes demanding behaviour change — the 1962 Cuban quarantine was compellence (force missile withdrawal), not deterrence.
- Deterrence
- Deterrence fails not when the threat is small but when any one of these conditions fails — a target who cannot compute, will not believe, cannot perceive, or has nothing to lose is undeterrable on that dimension.
This sourceDevelops deterrence versus compellence, the role of credible threats, second-strike capability, and signalling in strategic coercion (mutually assured destruction).
- Deterrence fails not when the threat is small but when any one of these conditions fails — a target who cannot compute, will not believe, cannot perceive, or has nothing to lose is undeterrable on that dimension.
Domain-specific¶
- Chicken Game
- The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is the canonical real-world chicken game, and Schelling's brinkmanship analysis was built on exactly this structure
This sourceThe volume where Schelling works the Cuban missile crisis as a central case of bargaining with military risk; the further identification of that crisis as a chicken game is the article's framing rather than a claim located in this text.
- The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is the canonical real-world chicken game, and Schelling's brinkmanship analysis was built on exactly this structure
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